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FREE EXERCISE IN THE FREE STATE: MARYLAND'S 




With the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights upon us, perhaps it is 
both inevitable and appropriate that debate over the scope and meaning 
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution remains as 
heated as ever. The limits of free speech, press, and assembly are fre-
quently drawn and challenged, but few issues are argued more keenly 
than those involving religion: the constitutionality of creches during 
Christmas, school prayer, Sunday closing laws and a myriad of others. 
The Supreme Court's docket is still liberally sprinkled with petitions call-
ing for renewed interpretation of the religion clauses. Does the rule 
against establishment prohibit any relationship between state and 
church, however non-preferential it may be? Does the guarantee of free 
exercise demand accommodation? 
Maryland arguably holds the distinction of being the state whose 
early history most directly ensured, and whose citizenry was most di-
rectly affected by, the First Amendment's protection of religious free-
dom. Because of its relatively diverse religious population, Maryland 
stood out as both a champion of tolerance and a hotbed of discrimination 
for much of its colonial experience. 1 Similarities have been pointed out 
between the first provincial government in St. Mary's, Maryland and the 
American plan under the Constitution? particularly with respect to reli-
gious liberty. ' 
This article offers a brief overview of the religious history of Mary-
land, focuses on important state cases that have contributed to the juris-
prudence of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses in the First 
Amendment and examines several unresolved issues engendered by re-
cent litigation and legislation. 
t A.B., 1963, The Johns Hopkins University; M.A., 1967, The Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity; J.D., 1966, University of Maryland School of Law; Visiting Scholar, Cam-
bridge University Faculty of Law 1985; Professor of Law, University of Baltimore 
School of Law. The writer is indebted to Aaron Lubling for his research assistance 
on the manuscript. 
l. Truman, Maryland and Tolerance, 40 Mo. HIST. MAG. 85, 86 (1945). A number of 
historians have noted that between the two original havens for the religiously perse-
cuted - Rhode Island and Maryland - the latter seems to have stood for a truer 
concept of religious toleration as it is thought of today. See, e.g., J. lvEs, THE ARK 
AND THE DOVE - THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES IN 
AMERICA 240-47 (1969); E. RILEY, MARYLAND, THE PIONEER OF RELIGIOUS LIB-
ERTY 34 (1917); W. RUSSELL, MARYLAND: THE LAND OF SANCTUARY 279-87 
(1908). 
2. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67 (1872). 
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II. MARYLAND EARLY ON: TOLERANCE AND 
PERSECUTION 
[Vol.18 
When George Calvert, the first Lord Baltimore, was granted a char-
ter to establish a colony in the new world, his primary goal was to create 
a haven for those persecuted by virtue of their religious beliefs. Calvert 
himself was a Catholic in limbo: by one measure a respected nobleman, 
by another an outcast in his own land. Although most of the settlers of 
early Maryland were Protestant, Calvert's plan was to create an environ-
ment where all Christians could worship freely. 3 
Indeed there were so few non-Christians in the colony that it is 
likely the famous Toleration Act of 16494 - even though it protected 
only those who believed in the Trinity - was widely regarded as a nota-
ble monument to religious liberty at the time of its enactment. 5 
Although conflicts did occur, the outward religious life of Maryland in 
the early seventeenth century was characterized by fair measures of con-
ciliation and respect. "To foster union, to cherish religious peace, these 
were the honest purposes" of the various Lords Baltimore during their 
long supremacy.6 
Nevertheless, despite the noble policies openly espoused by the 
Calverts and their subordinate governors, and the glowing pictures 
painted by optimistic poets of the age, an undercurrent of hostility per-
sisted. Protection rather than toleration became the reason for refuge in 
Maryland. The seeds of dissent were evident in 1676 when leading Prot-
estants submitted a proposal for "maintenance of a Protestant minis-
try."7 Charles Calvert, the third Lord Baltimore, responded with a 
"Paper Setting Forth the Present State of Religion in Maryland," which 
firmly pointed out that the colonists would not want to be made to sup-
port the ministers of another religion. 8 
In 1702, local Protestants finally succeeded in having the Church of 
England officially established as the Church of Maryland. From the mo-
ment of Establishment until the Declaration of Independence some sev-
enty-five years later, non-Protestant Marylanders suffered as much, if not 
more, religious persecution and intolerance than any of the other Ameri-
can colonists. Discrimination was not selective, but was levied against 
any faith other than the established one. Blasphemy was punishable by 
fine, imprisonment or death. 9 Only believers could vote, hold office and 
3. See E. ALLEN, MARYLAND TOLERATION 17-18 (1855); see a/so B.F. BROWN, 
EARLY RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF MARYLAND (1876). 
4. Act of April 21, 1649, 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 244. 
5. See C. HALL, THE LORDS OF BALTIMORE AND THE MARYLAND PALATINATE 66 
(1902). 
6. G. BANCROFf, A HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 327 
(1882). 
7. Letter of May 25, 1676 from John Yeo, Minister of Maryland, to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, 5 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 130-31. 
8. 5 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 133-34. 
9. SeeR. SEMMES, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MARYLAND 165-66 (1938). 
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practice a profession. 10 By 1749, exactly a century after the Act of Toler-
ation, Catholics could not celebrate the Mass publicly. 11 So keen was 
their persecution that the Catholic community authorized Charles Car-
roll, father of the signer of the Declaration of Independence, to apply for 
a tract of land in Louisiana.n "Religion among us," concluded the Rev-
erend Thomas Bacon, "seems to wear the face of the country: part mod-
erately cultivated, the greater part wild and savage." 13 
Against such an historical backdrop, it is easy to understand how 
Maryland's evolution from a state which originally insisted on the peace-
ful co-existence of different religious sects to its subsequent gross intoler-
ance toward Catholics and other dissenters influenced its participation in 
the American Revolution. 14 Bitter experience encouraged Maryland to 
lead the other colonies in the struggle to be free from taxes supporting a 
religion to which the taxpayer did not belong; to prohibit laws compel-
ling dissenters to attend services of the Established Church; to provide 
equal economic opportunities for dissenters; and indeed, to end all pref-
erences held by members of the dominant faith. 
On the eve of the Revolution, Baptists lay in Virginia jails for pub-
lishing their religious views, Catholics were still being threatened with 
death, and non-Christians were barely recognized. James Madison had 
just met his countryman and soon-to-be mentor Thomas Jefferson, and 
the two of them had begun to articulate their classic views on civil liber-
ties, particularly on freedom from the religious persecution they saw in 
their own and neighboring colonies. "Compulsion stincks in God's nos-
trils," said Jefferson. 15 "Religious bondage shackles and debilitates the 
mind and unfits it for every noble enterprize, every expanded prospect," 
wrote Madison. 16 Madison also felt strongly that without freedom of 
conscience there could be no freedom of speech, press, assembly or asso-
ciation, 17 and that moral decay was not the result of the absence of an 
10. See C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL EsTAB-
LISHMENT- FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
RELIGION CLAUSES 17 (1963); J. GAMBRILL, EARLY MARYLAND: CIVIL, SOCIAL, 
ECCLESIASTICAL 112-13 (1893). 
11. S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 35-77 (1902). In 1700, 
the Book of Common Prayer was made standard in the English Church, and in 
1704 Mass was permitted to be held only within a private family setting. /d. at 338-
39, 397. 
12. W. RussELL, supra note 1, at 414. 
13. /d. at 458. 
14. When in 1763 a tax for the support of the Established Church was revived, "a war 
of essays, as fierce as the war of words that preceded it" began in the press. It 
ultimately sparked a debate between Daniel Dulaney, the provincial secretary, and 
Charles Carroll of Carrollton, who spearheaded Maryland's fight for religious free-
dom and entry into the American Revolution. 2 J. SCHARF, HISTORY OF MARY-
LAND 125-26 & n.l (1879). 
15. L. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 4 (1963). 
16. I. BRANT, THE FOURTH PRESIDENT: A LIFE OF JAMES MADISON 17 (1970). 
17. /d. at 35. 
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established church but of wars and bad laws. 18 
Although there was no general aid to religion in Maryland during 
the immediate post-Revolutionary period, the State did indirectly sup-
port various churches and church-related schools. 19 Many states, in fact, 
thought it proper to aid the cause of religion and religious education by 
authorizing churches to conduct lotteries.20 
Indeed, non-preferential aid received the active backing of some of 
the new nation's most influential statesmen. In 1779, Patrick Henry in-
troduced a bill in the Virginia legislature for a general taxation to support 
all religions, and his efforts won the endorsement of none other than 
George Washington himself.21 Madison and Jefferson led the fight in 
opposition to Henry's proposal, a battle Jefferson would later regard as 
the severest he had ever undertaken.22 In 1784, Madison delivered his 
famous "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religions Assessments" 
- to many historians the most powerful defense of religious liberty ever 
written in America. 23 It claimed the right of every man to exercise reli-
gion according to the dictates of his own conscience. Such a right, ar-
gued Madison, was inalienable by nature, "a duty'towards the Creator" 
that was much older and deeper than the claims of civil society and 
"wholly exempt from its cognizance." The preservation of freedom, he 
declared, requires that governments not transgress the rights of the peo-
ple: "The rulers who are guilty of such an encroachment ... are tyrants. 
The people who submit to it ... are slaves. " 24 
For his part, Jefferson opposed both the plural establishments that 
existed in most of the states as well as non-preferential aid to all religions. 
To him, the concept of toleration was not much lesser an evil than an 
exclusive established church, because it implied that the state recognized 
only one "true" faith and that the others were merely granted a revocable 
license to ·exist. Matters of conscien~e, he felt, should be entirely free and 
18. ld. at 126. 
19. G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 44-45, 76-77 (1987); 
see a/so W. MARNELL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 67-68, 110 (1964). 
20. W. MARNELL, supra note 19, at 74. Non-preferential support was the primary form 
of establishment. Protestant Christianity became South Carolina's state church in 
1778. In Massachusetts, a tax to support Christian religions was passed in 1780. 
New York reserved certain parcels of land for Gospel schools in 1781. Finally, Con-
necticut passed a church-aid bill in 1784, as did Georgia in 1785. 
21. See L. LEVY, supra note 15, at 5. The tax proceeds were to be divided among the 
different denominations in the state. Each taxpayer was to designate the denomina-
tion to which the proceeds would be distributed. If no denomination was desig-
nated, the money would be divided equally among the churches in the taxpayer's 
county. Id. 
22. Id. at 3-4. 
23. See I. BRANT, supra note 16, at 128. 
24. /d. The effect of Madison's Remonstrance - together with his strategic support of 
Patrick Henry for Governor of Virginia, (from which position he could not as effec-
tively push for his general assessment to support churches) - was so great that 
Henry's bill lost without even a vote. See L. LEVY, supra note 15, at 7. 
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private.25 Accordingly, Jefferson introduced a "Bill for Establishing 
Religious Freedom," which, in diametric opposition to Henry's proposal, 
provided that "no man should be compelled to frequent or support any 
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever," nor be restrained in 
any way on account of his religious opinions.26 In 1785, Jefferson's bill 
was enacted by the Virginia legislature. "I flatter myself," Madison 
wrote, that the act has "extinguished forever the ambitious hope of mak-
ing laws for the human mind."27 Jefferson's pride of authorship was so 
great that he felt the measure as important as the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, at least insofar as it was a contribution for which he wanted to 
be remembered. 2s 
In the matter of non-preferential aid to religions, Madison and Jef-
ferson also differed with their Maryland counterparts. Even Charles Car-
roll of Carrollton, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, 
had voted in favor of a general tax to support religion in Maryland, as 
did Governor William Paca and future Supreme Court Justice Samuel 
Chase.29 What would have been the counsel of George Calvert, whose 
dream of religious freedom one hundred and fifty years earlier had still 
not been fulfilled, must be left to speculation. 
Good historical arguments can be mounted to support either view 
- that the Founding Fathers favored strict separation or that they fa-
vored non-preferential encouragement. There were eloquent spokesmen 
for each position, and the language ultimately adopted in the First 
Amendment allows for both interpretations. 
Prior to adoption of the Bill of Rights, in every state constitution 
where "establishment" of religion was mentioned, it was equated or used 
in conjunction with preference towards a favored religion. 3° From such 
evidence, it could be inferred that Congress intended the First Amend-
ment more as a protection of free exercise than as a prohibition of all 
government aid, however non-preferential. 
Indeed, part of the opposition to Maryland's ratifying the Constitu-
tion emanated from the convention's failure to adopt a bill of rights that 
would limit federal, but not state, control over religion. Among the 
amendments submitted by William Paca to the state's ratifying conven-
tion was one guaranteeing religious liberty to all and opposing national 
establishment.31 Although the convention adjourned without agreeing to 
25. L. LEVY, supra note 15, at 4. 
26. /d. at 6-7; see also G. BRADLEY, supra note 19, at 37-38. For the text of Jefferson's 
"Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," see id. at 149-50. 
27. I. BRANT, supra note 16, at 129. 
28. See L. LEVY, supra note 15, at 7. 
29. See G. BRADLEY, supra note 19, at 76-77. 
30. See id. 
31. See C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 132; see also Mar-
bury, Maryland Ratifies the United States Constitution: An Introduction, 83 Mo. 
HIST. MAG. 1 (1988) (special issue on the state's role in development of the federal 
Bill of Rights). 
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the proposed amendment, a large number of dissenting delegates had en-
dorsed the policy " 'that there be no national religion established by law; 
but that all persons be equally entitled to protection in their religious 
liberty.' " 32 The majority in Maryland was satisfied to leave such protec-
tion to the sovereign states. 33 Even the minority members, such as Car-
roll, Paca and Chase, were for the most part just multi-
establishmentarians who favored non-preferential church aid. 34 
During the course of debate on the federal Bill of Rights, the first 
Congress undoubtedly was responding not only to the religious concerns 
urged by Madison and Jefferson of Virginia, but as well to those espoused 
by Daniel and John Carroll of Maryland. Daniel Carroll was an espe.: 
cially eloquent and respected advocate of an amendment. The House 
Committee reporter paraphrased in part Mr. Carroll's thoughts as 
follows: 
As the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar deli-
cacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental 
hand; and as many sects have concurred in opinion that they 
are not well secured under the present constitution, he said he 
was much in favor of adopting the words. He thought it would 
tend more towards conciliating the minds of the people to the 
Government than almost any other amendment he had heard 
proposed. He would not contend with gentlemen about the 
phraseology, his object was to secure the substance in such a 
manner as to satisfy the wishes of the honest part of the 
community.35 
There was considerable debate over the language originally pro-
posed for the First Amendment: "No religion shall be established by law 
nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed. "36 Many were con-
cerned about avoiding the impression that religion should be abolished 
altogether.J7 Ultimately, the present Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses were adopted: "Congress shall make no law respecting the es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."38 And 
on September 25, 1789, the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution was accepted by Congress. 
But the debate over whether the religion clauses require complete 
separation or accommodation has never been put to rest. There can be 
32. See G. BRADLEY, supra note 19, at 76; see also A. WERLINE, PROBLEMS OF 
CHURCH AND STATE IN MARYLAND DURING THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHT-
EENTH CENTURIES 203 (1948). 
33. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 553 (Elliott ed. 1859); see also C. ANTIEAU, A. 
DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 132. 
34. A. WERLINE, supra note 32, at 203. 
35. L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 77 (1986). 
36. ld. at 91; J. IVES, supra note 1, at 393. 
37. See generally L. LEVY, supra note 15, at 5; I. BRANT, supra note 16, at 234-35. 
38. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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little doubt that Madison, the principle architect of the Bill of Rights, 
favored strict separation of church and state. 39 He had long opposed 
non-preferential aid to churches. In the First Amendment, his clear in-
tention was to prohibit states as well as the federal government from 
establishing any religion. Later, as president, he vetoed a federal grant of 
land to a Baptist church with a strict-separation explanation.40 
Madison's views, however, were hardly accepted in full by Congress. 
The Senate threw out his proposal to subject the states to a similar but 
separate restriction regarding establishment - the provision which 
Madison called the most valuable on his entire civil liberties agenda.41 It 
is likely that Madison's proposal fell victim to the legislators' sensitivity 
about avoiding anti-religious references. 
A full ten years after passage of the Bill of Rights the Baltimore 
Gazette asked editorially: 
What was the meaning of the Constitution in providing against 
a religious establishment? Does any man but Mr. Madison im-
agine it was to prevent the District of Columbia from enjoying 
legal church regulations, and from exercising corporate rights 
in their congregations? Does the Legislature of Maryland be-
lieve it is creating a religious establishment when it is occupied 
in granting charters to the churches of the different sects of 
christians as often as they apply? - Where all are equally pro-
tected and accommodated, where each sect . . . has its own 
establishment . . . the best security exists against 'a religious 
establishment,' that is to say, one pre-eminent establishment 
which is preferred and set up over the rest, against which alone 
the constitutional safeguard was created.42 
39. Accord G. BRADLEY, supra note 19, at 86. Bradley contends that Madison's depic-
tion as a supporter of accommodation is a historical misperception. /d. at 86-87. 
40. /d. In his early political life, however, Madison had voted several times for bills 
which reserved lands for religious organizations. /d. 
41. /d. at 87-93; I. BRANT, supra note 16, at 264-67. 
42. Baltimore Fed. Republican & Com. Gazette, Feb. 26, 1811, at 3, col. 1. 
Recent courts have taken similar views. Justice Douglas, in an oft-quoted pas-
sage from Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), stated: 
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. 
We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses .... We sponsor an 
attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one 
group and lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the 
appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages religious instructions or 
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public 
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then 
respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public 
service of our spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in 
the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indif-
ference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in 
no religion over those who do believe. 
/d. at 313-14. A 1956 Tennessee case pointed out that the doctrine of separation of 
church and state "should not be tortured into a meaning that was never intended by 
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Indeed, the guarantee of religious freedom did not become binding 
on the states until after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 
and its subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court in 1947 - al-
most eighty years later. 4 3 
When the First Amendment is viewed from this historical perspec-
tive, a case can be made for concluding that nothing more than a firmly 
bipartisan relationship of state to church was intended by the Founding 
Fathers. Consequently, arguments have been advanced like the 
following: 
The separation of the government from religion represents a 
definite departure from the intent of the Founding Fathers, 
who never intended to purge public life in America entirely of 
religion. They never intended to establish irreligion, nor was 
that the purpose of the First Amendment. Those who founded 
our nation did not hesitate to declare their dependence upon 
God, to mention Him in public utterance, to open Congress 
with prayer, to set up chaplaincies, and to ask the President to 
call a day for prayer and thanksgiving to God. They did not 
feel that this was inconsistent with the principle of 'a free 
Church in a free State.' As a matter offact, they knew that the 
very concept of religious civil liberty was founded upon Chris-
tian principles and teachings. 44 
the Founders of this Republic .... " Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. 665, 678, 288 
S.W.2d 718, 724 (1956). 
More recently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland took an expressly favorable 
view of bible reading in the public schools, claiming that "neither the First nor the 
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to stifle all rapport between religion and gov-
ernment." Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 244, 179 A.2d 698,701 (1962), rev'd sub 
nom. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See D. 
BOLES, THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 99 (1965). Even the 
dissenters in the Murray case did so because they felt that the required saying of the 
Lord's Prayer and bible reading plainly favored "one religion and [did] so against 
other religions and against non-believers in any religion." Murray, 228 Md. at 257-
58, 179 A.2d at 708 (Brune, CJ., dissenting). The dissenters neither denied that the 
First Amendment could involve non-discriminatory laws without being a violation 
of the freedom of religion nor insisted upon strict separation of church and state. 
Although the decision was· reversed by the Supreme Court in School Dist. of Abing-
ton Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), Justice Clark, speaking for the 
majority, was careful to warn against a "religion of secularism." /d. at 225. Justice 
Brennan, concurring in the same case, said that certain practices are to be consid-
ered constitutional - among them, churches and chaplains at military bases, "In 
God We Trust" on currency, tax exemptions for churches, draft exemptions for 
seminary students, and "one nation, under God" in the pledge of allegiance. /d. at 
295-304 (Brennan, J., concurring). But other Justices have voiced opposing views. 
See Note, Constitutional Law--Juries-Oath Required of Grand and Petit Jurors 
Held Unconstitutional- Schowgurow v. Maryland, 17 S.C.L. REV. 778, 780 (1965) 
[hereinafter Note, Unconstitutional Oath Requirements]. 
43. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
44. J. KIK, CHURCH & STATE-THE STORY OF TWO KINGDOMS 130 (1963). 
[A] regard for the separation principle should not obscure the fundamen-
tal consideration that there is a necessary interdependence of religion and 
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Other readers of history, however,. can makejust the opposite point, 
and just as cogently. If Magison were the primary author of the First 
Amendment, shouldn't his intentions be given the most credence? In 
Maryland itself, in 1785, a non-preferential church-aid bill, which ex-
empted non-Christians, was voted down by a resounding two-to-one ma-
jority of the legislature.45 In the nine states with multiple establishments, 
the pre-Bill-of-Rights revolution against an established religion took the 
form of a fight against taxation to support any churches. Mustn't we 
learn from this that the Founding Fathers' original intention was to pro-
hibit even non-preferential accommodation, to carve in stone the princi-
ple of strict separation? 
The choice between these interpretations is not clear, except through 
selective use of historical references. In the absence of more definitive 
history, the question remains to be answered by the Supreme Court as a 
determination of what sound public policy should be. Regardless of the 
outcome, however, it is apparent that the colonial experience in Mary-
land - together with the combined efforts of the Calverts and the Car-
rolls - contributed as much as any other single factor to laying the 
foundations for religious liberty and equality in the new republic. 
Largely through their efforts did the spirit of old Maryland make its way 
into that of the new America. 
III. RECENT MARYLAND CASES AND POTENTIAL 
PROBLEMS 
The twentieth century has seen no abatement of cases originating in 
Maryland and involving interpretation of the religious liberty clauses in 
both the state and federal constitutions. Over the past quarter-century, a 
number of landmark decisions have been handed down by the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland and the Supreme Court of the United States-
involving test oaths, school prayer, grants to sectarian colleges, clergy 
disqualification provisions, autopsies, religious headgear, Sunday closing 
laws, legislation to support religious dietary laws and divorces, and the 
erection of religious symbols on public property. A brief catalogue of the 
more important cases is presented here. 
A. Test Oaths 
In Torcaso v. Watkins, 46 a notary public duly appointed by the gov-
government, that religion and the churches have a role to play with re-
spect to the public order and the common life, that government has a role 
io perform in the protection and advancement of religious liberty, and that 
government and the churches share some overlapping concerns and 
functions. 
P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CON.STITUTION 118 (1964); see also W. KATZ, 
RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 30 (1963). . 
45. L. LEVY, supra note 35, at 48. · 
46. 223 Md. 49, 162 A.2d 438 (1960), rev'd, 367 U.S. 488.(1961). 
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ernor was denied his commission because he refused to declare a "belief 
in the existence of God," as required by article 37 of the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights.47 The court of appeals upheld the requirement, point-
ing out in the process: 
[W]e find it difficult to believe that the Supreme Court will hold 
that a declaration of belief in the existence of God, required by 
Article 37 ... is discriminatory and invalid. As Mr. Justice 
Douglas, speaking for a majority of the Court in Zorach v. 
Clauson said: 'We are a religious people whose institutions pre-
suppose a Supreme Being.'48 
Perhaps to the great disbelief of the court of appeals, the Supreme 
Court did find the test to be an unconstitutional violation of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments and reversed. It said: 
Nothing decided or written in Zorach lends support to the idea 
that the Court there intended to open up the way for govern-
ment, state or federal, to restore the historically and constitu-
tionally discredited policy of probing religious beliefs by test 
oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have, or perhaps 
more properly profess to have, a belief in some particular kind 
of religious concept. 49 · 
Torcaso's rejection of the requirement that an office-seeker declare his 
belief in a deity would likewise seem to invalidate the language, "attesta-
tion of the Divine Being" in article 39 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights. 5° 
In Schowgurow v. Maryland, 51 a Buddhist convicted of homicide 
challenged the requirement in article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights that jurors profess a belief in the existence of G-d. 52 Largely on 
47. /d. at 52-53, 162 A.2d at 439-40. Article 37 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights 
provides: 
That no religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any 
office of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the 
existence of God; nor shall the Legislature prescribe any other oath of 
office than the oath prescribed by this Constitution. 
Mo. DECL. RTS. art. 37. 
48. Torcaso, 233 Md. at 58, 162 A.2d at 443 (citation omitted). 
49. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494 (1961) (footnote omitted); see alsoP. KuR-
LAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 107-08 (1961). 
50. Article 39 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: 
That the manner of administering an oath or affirmation to any person, 
ought to be such as those of the religious persuasion, profession, or de-
nomination, of which he is a member, generally esteem the most effectual 
confirmation by the attestation of the Divine Being. 
Mo. DECL. RTS. art. 39. See generally White v. State; 244Md. 188, 223 A.2d 259 
(1966). 
51. 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965). 
52. /d. at 124-25, 213 A.2d at 478. Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights 
provides in pertinent part: 
[N]or shall any person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a 
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the basis of Torcaso, the court of appeals reversed: 
If, as was held by the Supreme Court in Torcaso, a notary pub-
lic cannot constitutionally be required to demonstrate his belief 
in God as a condition to taking office, it follows inevitably that 
the requirement is invalid as to grand and petit jurors, whose 
responsibilities to the public and to the persons with whom they 
deal are far greater.53 
91 
Thus, the court held unconstitutional the article 36 exclusion from jury 
duty of atheists, agnostics and religious groups such as Buddhists whose 
members do not believe in a Supreme Being. 54 
B. School Prayer 
It is doubtful that Madalyn Murray had any thoughts of challenging 
prayer in public schools before, by chance, she found herself in a Balti-
more City classroom during opening exercises. It was then that Mrs. 
Murray~ an avowed atheist, happened to hear the reading of a biblical 
passage - pursuant to a rule of the school commissioners that required 
"the reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or 
the use of the Lord's Prayer."55 She quickly took up the cudgels and 
challenged the practice as violative of the First Amendment's Establish-
ment Clause. 56 The trial court agreed, but was reversed by the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland - which held that the amount of time and public 
funds expended on the Bible reading was negligible, and that any student 
who did not want to participate could be excused upon presentation of a 
written note from his parents. 57 Mrs. Murray appealed to the Supreme 
Court. 
A year earlier, the Court had decided that a state-composed school 
prayer, even though expressly non-denominational, was unconstitu-
tional.58 Now it was faced with both Murray v. Curlett and School Dis-
trict of Abington Township v. Schempp, 59 the latter a Pennsylvania case 
witness, or juror, on account of his religious belief, provided, he believes in 
the existence of God, and that under His dispensation such person will be 
held morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished there-
for either in this world or in the world to come. 
MD. DECL. RTs. art. 36. For a discussion of the Schowgurow decision, see Note, 
Unconstitutional Oath Requirements, supra note 42. 
53. Schowgurow, 240 Md. at 127, 213 A.2d at 479. 
54. /d. at 128-31, 213 A.2d at 480-82. 
55. Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 241, 179 A.2d 698, 699 (1962), rev'd sub nom. 
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
56. William Murray, now a born-again Christian, says that the challenge would never 
have taken place had his mother not belatedly returned from a trip to Europe where 
she had been studying Communism, and in tum belatedly registered him after the 
school term had begun. Videotape interview between Jerry Fallwell and William 
Murray (Old Time Gospel Hour: Special Presentation). 
57. Murray, 228 Md. at 244, 179 A.2d at 701. 
58. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
59. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Both Murray and Schempp were consolidated for hearing. 
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testing that state's ritual daily Bible reading. 60 In each case, the Court 
found that the prayers, however non-compulsory they may have been, 
had a primarily religious effect and thus ran afoul of the Establishment 
Clause;61 moreover, even though the rules may have had secular pur-
poses such as promoting morality, countering materialism, or maintain-
ing tradition, they nevertheless amounted to an unconstitutional 
establishment of religion.62 The Court concluded that: 
[I]t is no defense to urge that-the religious practices here may 
be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment. 
The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all 
too soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, 
'it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our 
liberties. '63 
At the same time, however, the Court said that "the State may not estab-
lish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively opposing or 
showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no 
religion over those who do believe.' " 64 
In 1964, the General Assembly of Maryland passed a law allowing 
for a period of silent meditation in the opening exercises on each morning 
of a school day. 65 Mrs. Murray immediately sought to challenge the stat-
ute, but moved out of the state before any decision was rendered. 
In 1982, the Reagan administration proposed a constitutional 
amendment to permit school prayer, which would remove the policy de-
termination from the purview of the Supreme Court. 66 . The measure, 
however, received little support and ultimately failed. 67 
Litigation on the subject, however, continues. In Wallace v. Jaf-
free,68 the Supreme Court invalidated an Alabama statute which had au-
60. The statute at issue in Schempp provided: 
At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at 
the opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall be 
excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon 
the written request of his parent or guardian. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205. 
61. ld. at 223-25. 
62. /d. at 224-25. 
63. /d. at 225. 
64. /d. (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)). 
65. Act of April 7, 1964, ch. 189, 1964 Md. Laws 452 (codified at MD. EDuc. CODE 
ANN. § 7-104 (1985)). 
66. The proposed school prayer amendment provided: "Nothing in this Constitution 
shall be construed to prohibit individual or group prayer in public schools or other 
public institutions. No person shall be required by the United States or by any State 
to participate in prayer." See S.J. Res. 199, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982); S.J. Res. 
73, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983); see also S. REP. No. 347, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1984); S. REP. No. 348, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. REP. No. 165, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess. ( 1985). 
67. The measure failed for want of the two-thirds majority of the House and Senate 
needed to propose a constitutional amendment. 
68. 472 u.s. 38 (1985). 
1988] Free Exercise in the Free State 93 
thorized a minute of silence at the start of each school day for 
"meditation or voluntary prayer." By a 6-3 majority, the Court held that 
the state legislature's sole purpose in passing the law was to endorse reli-
gion and, therefore, the law was violative of the First Amendment under 
the tests enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 69 According to Lemon, 
there is no Establishment Clause violation if the law has a secular pur-
pose, if its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and if it 
does not foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 70 
In concurrence in Jaffree, however, Justices O'Connor and Powell 
said they would uphold the constitutionality of any such statute which 
had an explicitly secular purpose.7 1 Their chance to do just that came in 
1987 when the Court was faced with a New Jersey measure that called 
for a minute of silence before the start of each school day "for quiet and 
private contemplation or introspection. "72 But the Court dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds an appeal of the judgment below, which had 
struck down the statute as unconstitutional.73 
Current administrative guidelines in Maryland appear to ignore the 
Supreme Court's prohibitions against prayer in the public schools. Prin-
cipals and teachers "may require all students to ... participate in open-
ing exercises ... and to meditate silently for approximately 1 minute .... 
During this period, a student or teacher may read from the holy scripture 
or pray."74 
Most recently, a student at the University of Maryland sought to 
enjoin that institution from having religious invocations ~nd benedictions 
at its commencement exercises. The district court denied a temporary 
restraining order, 75 and the case became moot when the student gradu-
ated. But the Supreme Court's primary concern in the school-prayer 
cases has been the impressionability of young children - a concern 
clearly not as notable with college students, whom the Supreme Court 
has already characterized as "less susceptible to religious indoctrina-
tion."76 Moreover, opening prayers at occasional graduation ceremonies 
do not have the same impact as daily opening exercises, any more than 
do prayers at the beginning of legislative sessions. 
69. /d. at 55-61; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Court's conclusion in 
Jaffree was based ·largely on testimony from the state's chief sponsor that the bill's 
primary purpose was to return voluntary prayer to the schools, and that an existing 
Alabama statute had already provided for a moment of silence. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
at 43-44 n.22. 
70. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13; see also Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970); 
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). 
71. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 62-67 (Powell, J., concurring), 67-84 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
72. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-4 (West Supp. 1988). 
73. Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987). 
74. See MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7-104 (1985). 
75. Barry v. University of Maryland, C/ A R-87-3253 (D. Md. Dec. 3, 1987). 
76. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 
U.S. 783, 792 (1983); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765 (1976). 
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C Grants to Sectarian Colleges 
The potential for much greater church-state entanglement exists 
where legislatures seek to support sectarian schools by direct grants of 
financial assistance. Here too, Maryland has contributed some seminal 
jurisprudence. 
In Horace Mann League, Inc. v. Board of Public Works, 77 Maryland 
had provided outright matching grants for the construction of buildings 
at four private colleges: Hood College, Western Maryland College, Col-
lege of Notre Dame of Maryland and St. Joseph College. The appropria-
tions were challenged as violative of both the First Amendment and 
article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 78 
Although the lower court dismissed the complaint, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland, in a 4-3 decision, found that the grants to three of the 
institutions (all but Hood College) were unconstitutional.79 The court 
explained that every religious observance by a college does not make it 
sectarian; what is important is "a consideration of the observances, them-
selves, and the mode, zeal, and frequency with which they are made. "80 
If the schools are in fact sectarian, "'[n]o tax, in any amount, large or 
small, can be levied to support [them], whatever they may be called, or 
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.' " 81 The 
court found that, as to Hood College, the Protestant sect with which it 
was affiliated contributed only 2.2 percent of the school's operating 
budget and, moreover, there were no sectarian requirements for teachers 
or students. 82 The other schools, however, were more denominationally 
oriented; their governing boards were controlled by religious orders and 
their faculties were either committed to a Christian philosophy or were 
predominantly of one sect. 83 
Interestingly, the court of appeals found that none of the grants vio-
lated article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In support of this 
view, the court cited a number of cases to the effect that "grants to edu-
cational institutions at a level where the state has not attempted to pro-
vide universal educational facilities for its citizens have never, in 
Maryland, been held to be impermissible under Article 36, everi though 
the institutions may be under the control of a religious order. " 84 
77. 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966). 
78. Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides in pertinent part: "[N]or 
ought any person to be compelled to frequent, or maintain, or contribute, unless on 
contract, to maintain, any place of worship, or any ministry .... " Mo. DECL. RTs. 
art. 36. 
79. Horace Mann League, 242 Md. at 676, 679, 681, 684, 220 A.2d at 68, 70, 71, 73. 
80. /d. at 671, 220 A.2d at 65. 
81. /d. at 668, 220 A.2d at 63 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 
(1947)). 
82. /d. at 675, 220 A.2d at 67. 
83. /d. at 676-84, 220 A.2d at 68-73. 
84. /d. at 690, 220 A.2d at 76 (citing Speer v. Colbert, 24 App. D.C. 187 (1904), a.ff'd, 
200 U.S. 130 (1906); Mt. St. Mary's College v. Williams, 132 Md. 184, 103 A. 479 
(1918); Baltzell v. Church Home, 110 Md. 244, 73 A. 151 (1909)). 
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In a vigorous dissent, Judge Hammond argued that the grants of 
state aid served a sufficiently secular purpose to withdraw them from 
First Amendment prohibition. 85 Both sides appealed the majority deci-
sion to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. 86 
The Supreme Court, however, did agree to hear Roemer v. Board of 
Public Works, 87 which tested Maryland's annual subsidies to any accred-
ited private institution of higher learning for whatever use it prefers, with 
but one exception: "None of the moneys payable under this subtitle shall 
be utilized by the institutions for sectarian purposes."88 The district 
court had found the programs constitutional. 89 
Basing its analysis on the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 90 
the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court agreed with the lower court's 
finding that the primary purpose of the Maryland program "is the secular 
one of supporting private higher education generally, as an economic al-
ternative to a wholly public system."91 If the college in question were so 
"pervasively sectarian" that its secular and sectarian activities could not 
be separated, then the grant's primary effect would be the unconstitu-
tional advancement of religion.92 No such effect was found to exist in 
Roemer. 
The Court also cited its earlier decisions in Tilton v. Richardson 93 
and Hunt v. McNair 94 - each of which had found no excessive entangle-
ment where the government had funded the construction of various 
buildings at church-related colleges. In both cases, the facilities were not 
going to be used for sectarian purposes. But unlike Tilton or Hunt, 
which involved "one-time, single purpose" construction grants, Roemer 
involved annual subsidies which required regular audits and "govern-
mental analysis of ... expenditures"95 - both potentially "excessive en-
tanglements" under Lemon. 96 The Supreme Court dismissed the 
excessive entanglements argument on the grounds that such contacts are 
"quick and non-judgmental," and are not likely to be "any more entan-
gling than the inspections and audits incident to the normal process of 
the colleges' accreditation by the State. "97 
85. /d. at 698-99, 220 A.2d at 81 (Hammond, J., dissenting). Judge Hammond was 
joined by Judge Horney and Judge Marbury in dissent. 
86. Horace Mann League, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Works, 385 U.S. 97 (1966). 
87. 426 u.s. 736 (1976). 
88. MD. ANN. CODE art. 77A, §§ 65-69 (1975). 
89. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974). 
90. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also supra text accompanying note 70. 
91. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 754 (footnote omitted). 
92. /d. at 755; see also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973). 
93. 403 u.s. 672 (1971). 
94. 413 u.s. 734 (1973). 
95. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 763. 
96. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
97. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 764. 
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D. Clergy Disqualifications 
From early on, Maryland tried to ~raw a sharp line between clergy-
men and men of government: "No Minister or Preacher of the Gospel, 
or of any religious creed, or denomination ... shall be eligible as Senator, 
or Delegate. " 98 This provision appeared in Maryland's first constitution 
in 1776. It was eliminated in 1864 but was reinstated in the constitution 
of 1867 where it remained for more than a century.99 
In Kirkley v. State, 100 the plaintiff was a minister at St. Paul's United 
Methodist Church in Kensington, Maryland. Running for election to the 
House of Delegates, Kirkley challenged the constitutional restriction 
through an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the provision 
noted above violated the First Amendment. 101 The precise issue before 
the Kirkley court was whether disqualifying a minister from holding elec-
tive office would infringe upon the minister's right to free exercise of reli-
gion.102 In deciding that such a disqualification did indeed infringe upon 
the free exercise guarantee, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland rejected the argument that there is no element of reli-
gious coercion within the disqualification provision in view of the fact 
that no one is compelled to hold public office. 103 The court pointed to 
Torcaso v. Watkins, 104 where the Supreme Court had invalidated the 
Maryland requirement that one assuming a public office take an oath 
affirming his belief in G-d: 
The fact ... that a person is not compelled to hold public office 
cannot possibly be an excuse for barring him from office by 
state-imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution. . . . This 
Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally in-
vade[ d) the appellant's freedom of belief and religion .... 1o5 
Likewise, the Kirkley court rejected the argument that the burden 
placed upon a minister who seeks elective office is indirect (i.e., that the 
provision does not deny the minister his freedom to minister). 106 It cited 
Sherbert v. Verner, 107 in which a Seventh Day Adventist had been denied 
unemployment compensation benefits as a result of her refusal to work 
on Saturday. In Sherbert, it was argued that even though all other avail-
able jobs required a willingness to work on Saturday, the appellant's free 
98. See Kirkley v. State, 381 F. Supp. 327, 328 (1974); 56 Op. Att'y Gen. 25, 25 (1971). 
99. See 56 Op. Att'y Gen. at 26. 
100. 381 F. Supp. 327 (D. Md. 1974). The author represented Kirkley in the litigation 
described. 
101. /d. at 328. The State of Maryland made no attempt to block Kirkley's filing with 
the Board of Election Supervisors, in view of the Attorney General's opinion filed in 
1971. See 56 Op. Att'y Gen. 25 (1971). 
102. Kirkley, 381 F. Supp. at 329. 
103. /d. at 329-31. 
104. 367 U.S. 488 (1961); see also supra text accompanying notes 46-50. 
105. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495-96. 
106. Kirkley, 381 F. Supp. at 330. 
107. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
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exercise of religion was only indirectly burdened - she was not, after all, 
precluded from continuing to worship as a Seventh Day Adventist. But 
the Supreme Court in Sherbert ruled that the denial of benefits imposed 
an unconstitutional burden on free exercise: "It is too late in the day to 
doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the 
denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."108 
The court in Kirkley analyzed the clergy disqualification rule as a 
means of insuring the separation of church and state, in itself a compel-
ling governmental interest. 109 It found that disqualifying clergymen 
from holding elective office is by no means the least restrictive alternative 
of assuring the separation of church and state. Put another way, the 
disqualification is not "narrowly tailored" to the state's interest. 110 The 
court concluded: 
Yet today there are members of the clergy sitting in the Con-
gress of the United States and, in all probability, in the legisla-
tures of other states. Surely, this exclusion of ministers from 
elected office, if it. were necessary to insure the proper separa-
tion between Church and State, would extend also to federal 
office. This Court can discern no interest of the State of Mary-
land which would justify the burden upon the free exercise of 
religion imposed by Article III, Section 11 of the Maryland 
Constitution. 111 · 
Thus, more than a hundred years after its enactment, the Maryland 
clergy-disqualification provision was held to be unconstitutional. In 
1977, the clause was formally removed from. article III by a special legis-
lative amendment. 112 
E. Autopsies 
Maryland law requires post-mortem physical examinations where 
the deceased has died "suddenly [when] in apparent good health ... or in 
any suspicious or unusualiiJ.anner." 113 This provision was challenged in 
108. /d. at 404 (footnote omitted); see also Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 
109 S.Ct. 1514 (1989). 
109. Kirkley, 381 F. Supp. at 331. 
110. /d. 
111. /d. Tennessee was the last state still to have a clergy disqualification provision in its 
constitution. The Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld the provision, but the 
Supreme Court of the United States struck it down in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 
618 (1978), as violative of the guarantee of free exercise of religion. Justice White, 
concurring in McDaniel, questioned the free exercise basis of the majority's decision; 
he would have struck down the clergy disqualification provision as violative of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 643-
46 (White, J., concurring). 
112. Act of April 26, 1977, ch. 681, § 1, 1977 Md. Laws 2756. 
113. Mo. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-309(a)(iv), (v) (1982 & Supp. 1988). A post-
mortem physical examination is also required where the deceased has died by vio-
lence, suicide or casualty. /d. § 5-309(a)(i)-(iii). 
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Snyder v. Holy Cross Hospital 114 by a father whose eighteen-year-old boy 
died suddenly in his home, and who asserted that the autopsy ordered by 
a deputy state medical examiner would violate the family's religious 
principles. 115 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, analyzing the father's 
rights rather than those which might have survived the deceased, refused 
to enjoin the autopsy. 116 It held that acts in pursuit of a religious belief, 
as distinguished from the beliefs themselves, "may be regulated by the 
State to safeguard the peace, health, and good order of the community," 
and that here there was "a compelling state need to ascertain the cause of 
death." 117 
Apparently in response to cases such as Snyder, in 1982 the Mary-
land General Assembly enacted a statute providing that if the family of 
the deceased objects to an autopsy on religious grounds, the procedure 
may not be performed unless authorized by the state's chief medical ex-
aminer or his designee. us · 
F. Religious Headgear 
A similarly compelling state need in the context of religious expres-
sion was found in Goldman v. Weinberger, 119 where a captain in the 
United States Air Force challenged a military rule which prohibited the 
wearing of a skullcap while on duty. A sharply divided Supreme Court 
· held that the military's uniform dress code - designed to encourage "the 
subordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of the over-
all group mission" 120 - deserved greater deference than the plaintiff's 
free-exercise rights under the First Amendment. 121 
Four members of the Court wrote three dissenting opinions, led by 
Justice Brennan, who stated: 
I find totally implausible the suggestion that the overarching 
group identity of the Air Force would be threatened if Ortho-
dox Jews were allowed to wear yarmulkes with their uniforms. 
To the contrary, a yarmulke worn with a United States military 
uniform is an eloquent reminder that the shared and proud 
identity of United States service.men embraces and unites reli-
gious and ethnic pluralism.122 
While the Goldman case was working its way through the courts, 
the Department of Defense promulgated a regulation allowing various 
114. 30 Md. App. 317, 352 A.2d 334 (1976). 
115. /d. at 320-22, 352 A.2d at 335-37. The Snyders were Orthodox Jews. 
116. /d. at 328-33, 352 A.2d at 340-43. 
117. /d. at 332-33, 352 A.2d at 343. 
118. Mo. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-310(b)(2) (Supp. 1988). 
119. 475 u.s. 503 (1986). 
120. /d. at 508. 
121. /d. at 509-iO. 
122. /d. at 519 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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religious practices by servicemen (including the wearing of a skullcap) 
unless military necessity dictated otherwise. 123 The obvious ambiguity of 
this policy was removed, at least as it pertained to headgear, by a 1987 
act of Congress. 124 
While the Defense Department has in recent years been liberal in 
permitting religious headgear, it has been generally reluctant to grant 
exceptions where other religious practices are involved. 125 
G. Sunday Closing Laws 
In McGowan v. Maryland, 126 the United States Supreme Court up-
held Maryland's Sunday Closing Laws127 against a number of constitu-
tional attacks. The Court found valid secular purposes in the so-called 
"Blue Laws," which generally prohibited the sale on Sunday of all mer-
chandise other than food, medicine and gasoline. 128 In turning aside var-
ious First Amendment and Equal Protection challenges, the Court said: 
Laws setting aside Sunday as a day of rest are upheld, not from 
any right of the government to legislate for the promotion of 
religious observances, but from its right to protect all persons 
from the physical and moral debasement which comes from un-
interrupted labor. Such laws have always been deemed benefi-
cent and merciful laws ... and their validity has been sustained 
by the highest courts of the States. 129 
Despite the fact that choosing Sunday as the day of rest coincides with a 
specific religious practice, the Court held the law to be social welfare 
legislation and not a violation of the Establishment Clause.l3° 
In 1987, Maryland effectively repealed the Blue Laws in all counties 
123. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE No. 1300.17, ACCOMMODATION OF RELI-
GIOUS PRACTICES WITHIN THE MILITARY SERVICES (1985), cancelled by DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE No. 1300.17, ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS 
PRACTICES WITHIN THE MILITARY SERVICES (1988). 
124. This Act provides that members of the armed forces may wear items of religious 
apparel while wearing the uniform of the member's armed force except where the 
Secretary determines that the wearing of the item would interfere with the perform-
ance of military duties or where the apparel was not neat and conservative. Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-
180, Tit. V, § 508, 101 Stat. 1086-87 (1987) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 774 (Supp. V 
1987)). 
125. For example, numerous cases have been brought by Seventh Day Adventists, many 
of whom came from Takoma Park, Maryland, seeking to be excused from active 
service on Saturdays. Telephone interview with Chaplain General Israel Drazin, 
Apr. 5, 1989; see also Letter for Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci (Sept. 29, 
1988) (removing basic-training exception from DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIREC-
TIVE NO. 1300.17, ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES WITHIN THE 
MILITARY SERVICES (1988)). 
126. 366 u.s. 420 (1961). 
127. Specifically MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 521 (1987). 
128. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 433-37. 
129. /d. at 436 (quoting Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 (1885)). 
130. !d. at 445-52. 
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except Wicomico and Allegany. J3J A notable exception allows individu-
als who observe the Sabbath from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday, 
and who actually refrain from secular business and labor during that pe-
riod, to work on Sunday. 132 Thus, observant Jews and Seventh Day Ad-
ventists are exempt from application of the Blue Laws throughout 
Maryland. 
Germane to this discussion is Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 133 a 
1985 case in which the Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut stat-
ute which provided that "[a]n employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath 
shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal." 134 The Court maintained 
that this statute was not merely a permissible accommodation to religion, 
but granted an "absolute and unqualified right" that employees could 
impose on employers regardless of the burden placed upon the employ-
ers. It thus had an impermissible "primary effect" of advancing religion: 
This unyielding weighing in favor of Sabbath observers over all 
other interests contravenes a fundamental principle of the Reli-
gion Clauses, so well articulated by Judge Learned Hand: 'The 
First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in 
pursuit of their own interests others must conform their con-
duct to his own religious necessities.' 135 
In the absence of Blue Laws, Thornton takes on a new significance in 
Maryland. What protection is now available to a Marylander who on 
religious grounds refuses to. work on Sunday but whose employer has 
decided to open for business on that day? Obviously, the Connecticut 
approach will not help the employee. The Maryland exception allows an 
employee the right to notify his employer of a special day of rest, and 
prohibits his discharge. if he refuses to work on that day. 136 It is difficult 
to distinguish this provision from the Connecticut statute struck down in 
Thornton. 
H. Dietary Laws and Divorce 
Like many states, Maryland has enacted statutes to protect all peo-
ple (but particularly Orthodox Jews) who abide by the Biblical laws per-
taining to the slaughtering of fowl and animals and the consumption of 
kosher foods. Maryland's statutory scheme is contained in several sec-
tions of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Annotated 
Code. 137 These sections are couched in the language of consumer protec-
131. The Blue Laws still in effect can be found in Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 492-534X 
(1987). 
132. Id. § 521(e)(2). 
133. 472 u.s. 703 (1985). 
134. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(b) (1985). 
135. Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 710 (citing Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 
58, 61 (2nd Cir. 1953)); cf supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text. 
136. See Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 492(b) (1987). 
137. Mo. COMM. LAW ANN. §§ 14-901 to -907 (1983). 
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· tion law, and deal primarily with the misrepresentation of non-kosher 
food as being kosher and the labeling of specific products as "Kosher for 
Passover." 138 
While there has not been significant litigation regarding Maryland's 
laws regarding kosher food, some questions about their constitutionality 
have been raised. Do such statutory provisions violate the Establish-
ment/Free Exercise Clauses? Is the characterization "kosher" unconsti-
tutionally vague, since "[n]o two rabbis could agree as to the meaning of 
the word?" 139 
Courts have answered both of these questions in the negative, main-
taining that laws regulating kosher foods, far from violating the religious 
guarantees of the First Amendment, in fact protect the free exercise of 
religion. 140 It has been held that the laws are not void for vagueness: 
because they require a specific intent to defraud, specificity as to the 
meaning of "kosher" is not required. Furthermore, such statutes have 
been upheld as necessary for effective consumer protection. 141 
The Maryland Code gives particular protection to the Orthodox 
Jewish method of slaughtering animals, describing it as "humane." 142 
As it happens one of the Code sections is titled "Protection of freedom of 
religion." 143 In addition, Maryland has enacted consumer legislation to 
protect the purchasers of specific religious articles such as phylacteries 
and doorpost parchments (mezuzohs) from misrepresentations by the 
seller as to their genuineness. 144 
Jewish divorces create different problems. There are three possible 
domestic relations contracts under which a secular court could be called 
upon to compel a husband to appear before a religious court for the pur-
pose of forcing him to grant a divorce to his wife: 
(1) a clause in the ketuba, or Jewish marriage contract; 
(2) an antenuptial agreement; 
(3) a separation agreement. 
The problem arises when the parties to these contracts have agreed 
138. See, e.g., MD. CoMM. LAw ANN.§ 14-903 (1983) ("False or misleading representa-
tions in sale of food products"); /d. § 14-905 ("Preparation and service of food 
products"); /d. § 14-906 ("Advertisement of place of business or food products"). 
139. Erlich v. Municipal Court, 55 Cal. 2d 553, 555-57, 11 Cal. Rptr. 758, 759, 360 P.2d 
334, 335 (1961). 
140. See, e.g., Erlich, 55 Cal. 2d 553, 11 Cal. Rptr. 758, 360 P.2d 334 (definition of 
Kosher not void for vagueness); Sossin Systems, Inc. v. Miami Beach, 262 So. 2d 28 
(Fla. App. 1972) (ordinance which prohibited fraudulent sale of food labeled as 
Kosher served to safeguard free exercise of religion); People v. Goldberger, 163 
N.Y.S. 663 (Sp. Sess. 1916) (protection afforded by fraudulent food statute was in 
accord with free exercise and enjoyment of religious worship). 
141. For a general discussion of dietary laws with respect to freedom of religion, see 
Annotation, Validity and Construction of Regulations Dealing With Misrepresenta-
tions in the Sale of Kosher Food, 52 A.L.R.3D 959 (1973). 
142. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 333A-333D (1987). 
143. /d. § 333C. 
l44. MD. COMM. LAW ANN. § 14-908 (1983). 
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to arbitrate their domestic relations disputes before a religious tribunal 
known as a beis din. Arbitration clauses have generally been upheld by 
the courts through application of neutral principles of contract law. 145 It 
is possible, however, that the right-to-divorce clause in a ketuba would 
raise questions as to the enforcement of a religious document by a secular 
court - a potentially impermissible entanglement of church and state. 
At least one court, however, has held that a beis din clause, although 
grounded in religious belief, could be enforced under secular law. 146 
An interesting question arises when there is no specific divorce 
clause in the marriage contract. The ketuba obligates the parties to abide 
by the "Laws of Moses and Israel" - one of which requires the husband 
to deliver a divorce document to his wife. Arguably, a court using neu-
tral principles of contract law could order specific performance by requir-
ing the husband to give his wife a divorce, not just to appear before a be is 
din.t47 
L Religious Symbolism 
1. Creches and Menorahs 
The first case to come before the Supreme Court regarding the con-
stitutionality of a state-sponsored creche on Christmas was Lynch v. Don-
nelly,148 decided in 1983. Every holiday season for approximately forty 
years the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, had been placing the manger 
scene in a park owned by a nonprofit organization. It was part of a dis-
play which included a "Season's Greetings" banner, a Santa Claus house, 
and a Christmas tree, all of which were owned by the city. 149 
In holding that the Pawtucket creche did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause, the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 majority, stated: 
[O]ur history is pervaded by expressions of religious beliefs .... 
Equally pervasive is the evidence of accommodation of all 
faiths and all forms of religious expression, and hostility toward 
none. Through this accommodation, as Justice Douglas ob-
served, governmental action has 'follow[ed] the best of our tra-
ditions' and 'respect[ed] the religious nature of our people.' 150 
145. See, e.g., Waxstein v. Waxstein, 90 Misc.2d 784, 395 N.Y.S. 2d 877 (1976), a.lf'd, 57 
A.D.2d 863, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253, cert. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 806, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 
367 N.E.2d 660 (1977). 
146. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 446 N.E.2d 136, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983). 
147. In fact, this was the holding in Minkin v. Minkin, 180 N.J. Super. 260, 434 A.2d 
665 (1981). 
148. 465 u.s. 668 (1984). 
149. In 1973, Pawtucket acquired the creche in question for $1,365. Erection and dis-
mantling of the display cost the city about $20 per year, with similarly nominal 
expenses incurred for lighting. /d. at 671. 
150. /d. at 677-78. 
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In each case, said Chief Justice Burger for the majority, the inquiry 
calls for line-drawing; the purpose of the Establishment Clause " 'was to 
state an objective, not to write a statute.' . . . The line between permissi-
ble relationships and those barred by the Clause can no more be straight 
and unwavering than due process can be defined in a single stroke or 
phrase or test." 151 
Though emphasizing its "unwillingness to be confined to any single 
test or criterion in this sensitive area," 152 the Court nevertheless found 
that the Pawtucket creche violated no part of the famous three-prong 
standard enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman: it had a secular purpose; its 
primary effect neither advanced nor inhibited religion; and it did not re-
sult in excessive church-state entanglement. 153 The Court concluded 
that. "[w ]hen viewed in the proper context of the Christmas Holiday sea-
son, it is apparent that, on this record, there is insufficient evidence to 
establish that the inclusion of the creche is a purposeful or surreptitious 
effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a particu-
lar religious message.'' 154 
In 1984, McCreary v. Stone 155 extended what seemed to have been 
the narrow holding of Lynch. The Village of Scarsdale, New York, 
sought to prohibit a private citizens' group from placing its creche on 
public property. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had used a 
freedom of speech analysis in ruling that the Scarsdale creche amounted 
to symbolic speech. 156 Governmental interference with the content of 
speech in a traditional public forum must survive strict scrutiny in order 
to be constitutional. 157 The court rejected the Village's argument that 
maintenance of the separation between church and state was a compel-
ling reason for outlawing the display on public property, finding instead 
that the prohibition was not necessary at all. 158 An equally divided 
Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit, though such a result has no 
binding precedential value for other jurisdictions. 159 
Indeed, the law on the creche issue is far from settled. McCreary 
extended Lynch in two significant ways. Lynch had found that a publicly 
owned creche may be placed on private property, but it also had confined 
its permissive holding to a scene which was part of a larger secular dis-
play (Santa Claus, reindeer, etc.). 160 Not only did McCreary permit a 
privately owned creche, standing alone, on public property, it rejected all 
151. /d. at 678-79 (citation omitted). 
152. ld. at 679. 
153. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see also supra text accompanying note 70. 
154. /d. at 680 (emphasis added). 
155. 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 83 (1985) (equally divided). 
156. /d. at 723. 
157. /d. 
158. /d. 
159. Full briefs were submitted and oral arguments heard, but no opinion was written. 
Scarsdale v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985). Justice Powell took no part in the 
decision. 
160. See supra text accompanying note 154. 
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attempts at distinguishing between the displays in Scarsdale and Paw-
tucket. The Second Circuit stated: 
[T]he Village's reading of Lynch is erroneous as applied to this 
case. The Supreme Court did not decide the Pawtucket case 
based upon the physical context within which the display of the 
creche was situated; rather the Court consistently referred to 
'the creche in the context of the Christmas season.' 161 
In 1987, the Seventh Circuit put at least a temporary halt to the 
expansive reading given Lynch by the McCreary court. In American Jew-
ish Congress v. Chicago, 162 the court held that the placement of the 
creche in city hall - both seat and symbol of government power and 
action - was in and of itself violative of the Establishment Clause. 
Although the creche in American Jewish Congress was placed in the 
City Hall of Chicago, not in the "traditional public forum" (a park) as in 
Scarsdale, it is important to the religious symbol issue that the Seventh 
Circuit clearly accepted the "physical-context-of-the-display-as-a-whole" 
argument, which had been rejected outright by the Second Circuit in 
McCreary. 163 
Other seasonal symbols, such as Christmas trees and Chanukah me-
norahs, have long been displayed on public property and have seldom 
provoked litigation. When a challenge does arise, some courts, using the 
McCreary analysis, have permitted the erection of a menorah on public 
property for the lighting ritual. 164 If there is any common thread to the 
cases, it is that the decisions of local authorities as to whether to ban or 
permit menorahs will be upheld by the courts. 165 
In Lubavitch of Iowa, Inc. v. Walters, 166 the Lubavitch, a chassidic 
group, sought permission to erect a menorah on the grounds of the Iowa 
State House. The State, based on an informal opinion from its attorney 
general, told the group that it could have a lighting ceremony on state 
161. McCreary, 739 F.2d at 729. 
162. 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987). 
163. !d. at 125. The court in McCreary had also rejected an attempt to distinguish Lynch 
by the ownership of the property upon which the creche would be placed. Mc-
Creary, 739 F.2d at 729. It is interesting to note that the American Jewish Congress 
court did not seem especially concerned about whether a creche itself-or a park in 
which it might be displayed-is publicly or privately owned. It lumped Lynch (pri-
vate park) and McCreary (public park) together as "park cases," to be distinguished 
from those where a governmental building is involved. American Jewish Congress, 
827 F.2d 126 n.2. 
164. See, e.g., ACLU v. County of Allegheny, CIA 86-2617 (W.D. Pa. 1986); Okrand v. 
Willeins, #C-577-925 (Sup. Ct., L.A. County 1986). However, there are those who 
argue that once the ritual is over the menorah may not be left on public property 
because it is no longer an implement of symbolic speech. SeeM. Stern, The Year of 
the Menorah 12 (May, 1987) (The David V. Kahn Re~ource Center- The Fund 
for Religious Liberty of the American Jewish Congress). 
165. The Year of the Menorah, supra note 164, at 19 (Appendix A). 
166. 808 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1986). 
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property each night if it would remove the menorah afterwards. 167 The 
Lubavitch filed suit; arguing that the menorah is not a religious symbol, 
that the State House grounds are a public forum, that the placement of a 
menorah does not "establish" religion, and that banning menorahs but 
not Christmas trees unconstitutionally favors one religion over another. 
The federal district court rejected these arguments and denied the re-
quest for a preliminary injunction against the State. 168 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, by a 2-1 vote.l69 
A number of other state courts have allowed a public menorah-
lighting ceremony each night of Chanukah, but have required that the 
menorah be removed after the ceremony. 170 The rationale seems to be 
that under McCreary, a person has a free-speech right to place a religious 
symbol in a public forum, but this right is limited to the person in the 
forum. Once the ceremony is over and the symbol's advocate has left, it 
begins to look like official state sponsorship of a particular religion. 171 
No such erection/dismantling analysis has ever been applied to a 
creche, perhaps because it is not the subject of any ceremony nor is its 
placement, in and of itself, the symbolic speech of its advocate. Such 
distinctions, however, appear strained and unpersuasive. If a menorah 
can only be placed in a public forum when an advocate stands next to it, 
why is the same not true for a creche? 
In Maryland, there has been widespread and long-standing tolera-
tion of both creches and menorahs. In 1987, however, the issue became 
the subject of heated debate. For many years Christmas trees and meno-
rahs had been erected by neighborhood associations on public property, 
but the more specifically religious manger scenes were usually displayed 
only by Christian groups on church grounds. In recent years, though, 
the Baltimore County government has constructed a creche on the front 
lawn of the county courthouse. In response to protests from a coalition 
of Christian and Jewish organizations, the County Executive said that he 
would order the creche placed in the midst of a "wide variety of sym-
bols."172 He appeared determined to keep the county's creche, but to 
stay well within the guidelines indicated by the Supreme Court in Lynch 
v. Donnelly. 173 As it happened, however, the County Executive backed 
167. See The Year of the Menorah, supra note 164, at 21 (Appendix A). 
168. Lubavitch oflowa v. Walters, C/ A 86-901-B (S.D. Iowa 1986), aff'd, 806 F.2d 656 
(8th Cir. 1986). 
169. Lubavitch of Iowa v. Walters, 806 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1986). In dissent, Judge Ar-
nold argued that he would not enjoin the display of a menorah on state.-house 
grounds if Christmas trees were allowed to stand there. /d. at 657 (Arnold, J., 
dissenting). 
170. See The Year of the Menorah, supra note 164, at 19-24 (Appendix A). 
171. See id. at 12. 
172. Letter from Baltimore County Executive Dennis Rasmussen to Baltimore Director 
Maggie Gaines (Aug. 11, 1987). 
173. 465 U.S. 668 (1984); see also supra notes 148-154 and accompanying text. Cer-
tainly, the Baltimore County creche would not have sur:vived the Seventh Circuit's 
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down, and there was no creche on the courthouse lawn in 1988. 174 
In February 1989, the Supreme Court heard arguments in two cases 
involving religious symbols placed inside the main entrance of a court-
house and on the steps of a county office building. 175 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit held that such a placement of both a creche 
and menorah violated the Establishment Clause, because the symbols 
were placed near "core functions" of government in prominent view 
where visitors would see them, and because neither symbol was "sub-
sumed by a larger display of non-religious items." 176 As of this writing, 
the Supreme Court has not decided the case. 177 
2. Eruvs 
An eruv is a symbolic enclosure which enables Orthodox Jews to 
perform certain tasks on their sabbath which they would otherwise be 
unable ~o do. It is usually constructed by using the wires strung along 
existing utility poles that are located on public property. The costs of 
construction are minimal and are borne privately. Many communities 
around the country currently have eruvs in operation. Those in Balti-
more and Silver Spring are among the largest. 
It is difficult to argue that such physically innocuous enclosures, 
which in and of themselves are not holy symbols, could constitute exces-
sive entanglements between church and state - especially in light of the 
Supreme Court's recent pronouncements allowing creches on public 
property. 178 Nevertheless, in 1987, the American Civil Liberties Union 
challenged the eruv around Long Branch, New Jersey as a violation of 
the Establishment Clause. 179 In granting the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey held that the city's authorization of an eruv on public prop-
erty was not excessive entanglement where no public funds were ex-
pended and where the eruv boundaries were invisible and had no 
independent religious significance. 180 The court concluded that: 
Providing equal access to public facilities to people of all reli-
gions and enabling individuals to get to and from their chosen 
analysis in American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1984). See 
supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text. 
174. Meanwhile, when the Baltimore City Council sought to erect a public menorah 
which would be ceremonially lit by a rabbi, the attempt failed because no rabbi was 
willing to participate. The Year of the Menorah, supra note 164, at 11 n.12. 
175. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 57 U.S.L.W. 3563 (Feb. 22, 1989) (oral argument 
summary). 
176. ACLU v. County of Allegheny, 842 F.2d 655, 662 (3rd Cir.), cert. granted, 109 
S.Ct. 53, 54 (1988). The court also noted that a menorah "is not associated with a 
holiday with secular aspects." Id. 
177. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 57 U.S.L.W. 3563 (Feb. 22, 1989). 
178. See supra notes 148-177 and accompanying text. 
179. ACLU v. City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293 (D. N.J. 1987). 
180. Id. at 1295. 
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place of worship safely are permissible accommodations by the 
government. The government is permitted to fix sidewalks 
outside churches, provide police protection and basic utilities 
for mass outdoor religious gatherings, provide police to direct 
traffic into synagogue parking lots and authorize a house of 
worship to install additional street lights on public property to 
facilitate access to evening services. 181 
J. Restrictive Zoning 
107 
There have been many cases nationally where communities have 
sought to protect or limit various religious activities. Most of them in-
volve the use of new or existing ordinances to allow or prevent the con-
struction of churches or synagogues. 
In Winchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 182 for example, the Court of 
Appeals of New York held that although zoning ordinances find their 
justification in the state's police power, nevertheless "churches and 
schools occupy a different status from mere commercial enterprises." 183 
Likewise, in Lubavitch Chabad House v. City of Evanston, 184 the Appel-
late Court of Illinois held that the denial of a special use permit to a 
nonprofit religious organization to use a building as a sanctuary was an 
infringement of its religious freedom, particularly where the only appar-
ent difference between the plaintiff organization and others in the imme-
diate area was its adherence to strict orthodox observance of Jewish 
(Hasidic) practices and customs. 185 "First Amendment rights and free-
doms," said the court, "far outweigh considerations of public inconven-
ience, annoyance, or unrest." 186 
The state must draw fine lines, however, in order to avoid violating 
the Establishment Clause through excessive entanglement with existing 
churches. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 187 for example, the Supreme 
Court struck down by an 8-1 margin, a Massachusetts statute which 
vested in the governing bodies of religious organizations the power to 
veto applications for liquor licenses within a 500-foot radius of church 
buildings. 
In 1987, an ordinance was proposed in the Baltimore City Council 
which would have limited the construction of new churches, temples, 
and synagogues by increasing the minimum lot area and off-street park-
ing spaces required in certain zones. 188 The bill was originally suggested 
181. /d. 
182. 22 N.Y.2d 488, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297, 239 N.E.2d 891 (1968). 
183. /d. at 492-94, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 300-01, 239 N.E.2d at 894. 
184. 112 Ill. App. 3d 223, 445 N.E.2d 343 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983). 
185. /d. at 227-28, 445 N.E.2d at 347. 
186. /d. at 227, 445 N.E.2d at 347. 
187. 459 U.S. 116 (1982). Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist was the lone dissenter in 
Larkin. See id. at 127-30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
188. Baltimore City Council Bill No. 1540 (1987). 
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by a neighborhood improvement association.alarmed by the proliferation 
of churches and synagogues in its area. Although the proposal was with-
drawn by its sponsors before its constitutionality could be debated, senti-
ment both pro and con ran deep in the community involved, and 
attempts to enact similar restrictive laws in the future may be inevitable. 
Such efforts to "zone out" churches and synagogues could be chal-
lenged under a variety of theories, the most obvious of which are the 
Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses of the United States Consti-
tution. A more novel and perhaps more efficacious approach might be a 
lawsuit under Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act, which guarantees all 
Americans "the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and versonal prop-
erty," and forbids both state and local interference with property 
rights.I 89 Unlike Equal Protection and Free Exercise challenges, a sec-
tion 1982 lawsuit does not require state action in order to be viable. In 
addition, attorneys' fees may be recoverable. 190 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The question most directly involved in interpreting the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment is whether the Founding Fathers 
intended a complete separation of church and state or instead, would 
permit non-discriminatory government participation. 
Prior to adoption of the Bill of Rights, in every state constitution 
where "establishment" .of religion was mentioned, it was equated or used 
in conjunction with "preference." A logical inference might be drawri 
that Congress intended the First Amendment to serve more to protect 
"free exercise" than to forbid all government aid, however non-preferen-
tial. Undoubtedly, some of the Framers - particularly Madison and 
Jefferson- favored full severance of church and state. But that feeling 
was hardly unanimous, and there is historical evidence to support a con-
trary view. Moreover, because the Constitution is a living document and 
must be read in the light of contemporary standards and events, it may 
be (and has been) argued that the intent of the Framers is not necessarily 
determinative. From these perspectives, those who emphasize the impor-
tance of free exercise and those who are concerned with prevention of 
establishment can each debate with convincing logic. 
Even now, two hundred years after the birth of the First Amend-
ment, the questions have not been conclusively decided. In light of am-
ple history to support each of the competing views, the Supreme Court 
189. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982); see also Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 
(1987) (upholding the right of a Jewish person to sue under the Civil Rights Act in a 
case involving synagogue vandalism). 
190. For a good discussion of zoning ordinances and houses of worship, see Annotation, 
Zoning Regulations as Affecting Churches, 74 A.L.R.2d 377 (1960 & Later Case 
Service). See also Edwin Meese III, G-d and Man at the Zoning Board, Intermoun-
tain Jewish News, Mar. 31, 1989, §A, at 32. 
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will have to make an independent judgment - one .not based on incon-
clusive eighteenth-century evidence - as to whether the nation in 1990 
needs accommodation or strict separation. Regardless of the outcome, 
the Court will build upon the enduring foundations laid in Maryland. 
The policies so vigorously espoused by the Calverts and the Carrolls in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries-their roots firmly embedded in 
the law of the land-are still being refined, two hundred years later. 
